## Message Text

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INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 SIG-03 PM-05 H-02 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 PA-02 SP-02 SS-15 SSO-00 INRE-00 ACDA-12 AID-05 ARA-14 DOE-11 SOE-02 /109 R

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TO ALL AFRICAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

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UNCLAS STATE 052898

E.O. 11652:N/A

TAGS: PFOR

SUBJECT: DEPARTMENT OF STATE PRESS BRIEFING MARCH 1, 1978

FOLLOWING ARE EXCERPTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE NOON BRIEFING, MARCH 1, 1978:

Q: ASSUMING YOU'RE AWARE OF DR. BRZEZINSKI'S REMARKS THIS MORNING, WHAT IMPACT, IF ANY, DOES SOVIET ACTIVITY IN AFRICA HAVE ON THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS?

A: I SAW WHAT HE SAID, AND I'VE BEEN FURNISHED A TRANSUNCLASSIFIED

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CRIPT OF IT. I DON'T THINK IT TAKES US BEYOND WHAT I BELIEVE THE SECRETARY AND PERHAPS OTHER ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS HAVE SAID, WHICH IS THAT, ONE, WE DO NOT HAVE A LINKAGE, WE DO NOT ESTABLISH A LINKAGE OURSELVES BETWEEN SALT AND ANY OTHER ASPECT OF POLICY. THAT IS, WE THINK THAT THE ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST SALT TREATY NEGOTIATIONS AND WHAT-HAVE-YOU STAND ON THEIR OWN.

WHAT HE WAS SAYING WAS ANOTHER WAY OF SAYING WHAT WE DO THINK IS OBVIOUS, THAT EVENTS SUCH AS THE INTRUSION INTO

THE HORN HAVE AN OBVIOUS AND INEVITABLE POLITICAL EFFECT WHICH CAN SPILL OVER AND MAY WELL SPILL OVER INTO OTHER ASPECTS OF POLICY, AND IN THIS CASE, DR. BRZEZINSKI IS

SPECIFICALLY SPEAKING OF ITS POSSIBLE EFFECT ON SALT.

LET ME JUST SAY THAT AS A MATTER OF POLICY THERE IS NO LINKAGE. AS A MATTER OF JUST INEVITABLE POLITICAL EFFECT, THE EVENTS IN THE HORN, AS THE SECRETARY I THINK SAID, EITHER IN A NEWS CONFERENCE OR AT SOME POINT RECENTLY, ARE BOUND TO AFFECT THE POLITICAL CLIMATE IN WHICH BOTH THE NEGOTIATIONS MUST BE CARRIED ON AND AN AGREEMENT MUST EVENTUALLY BE CONSIDERED, THAT IS TO SAY, RATIFIED.

Q: WELL, HODDING, THE MESSAGE DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE GETTING THROUGH VERY WELL BECAUSE ACCORDING TO THE FIGURES THAT YOU PUT OUT MONDAY AFTERNOON, THERE ARE NOW, 37,000 CUBANS IN AFRICA, PRESUMABLY WITH SOVIET HELP AND CONSENT, AND MORE ARE ON THE WAY AND ARE EXPECTED TO ARRIVE MOMENTARILY. SO WHAT CONCLUSIONS DO YOU DRAW FROM THESE TWO EVENTS?

A: THERE IS A FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION ON THIS UNCLASSIFIED

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SUBJECT THAT WE HAVE FOUND IN OUR EXPLORATIONS PRIVATELY AS WELL AS PUBLICLY, AND THAT DIFFERENCE HAS BECOME CLEAR.

- Q: AND YOU CONTINUE TO MAKE YOUR VIEWPOINT CLEAR DIRECTLY TO THEM --
- A: YES, WE DO.
- Q: -- APART FROM FORUMS SUCH AS THIS. HOW?
- A: IN CONVERSATIONS AT THE AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL, AND I THINK YOU ARE AWARE OF MEETINGS THAT TAKE PLACE RATHER REGULARLY.
- Q: DOES THEIR BEHAVIOR SEEM TO SUGGEST THE MESSAGE IS GETTING THROUGH? DO YOU THINK THERE WOULD BE TWICE AS MANY RUSSIANS THERE IF YOU WEREN'T TALKING TO THEM?
- A: THERE ARE TWO DIFFERENT QUESTIONS. I'M WILLING TO CONCEDE, AND IT'S OBVIOUS ON ITS FACE, THAT ACTIVITIES ARE CONTINUING WHICH WE ARE PROTESTING. THEREFORE, THEY'RE NOT AGREEING WITH THE MESSAGE. NOW, "IS THE MESSAGE GETTING THROUGH?" YES, THEY ARE HEARING THE MESSAGE. THERE IS NO WAY FOR THEM NOT TO BE HEARING IT.
- Q: HODDING, IF I CAN UNDERSTAND YOUR EXPLANATION,

WHAT YOU'RE SAYING IS, AS A MATTER OF POLICY THERE IS NO LINKAGE. BUT AS A PRACTICAL MATTER. THERE IS LINKAGE?

A: THERE MAY WELL BE SUCH LINKAGE. THAT IS TO SAY THERE MAY WELL BE THE POLITICAL EFFECT AND THAT IS JUST

SORT OF LIKE STATING THE OBVIOUS.

Q: WELL, IT IS NOT THE OBVIOUS. IF YOU SAY IT AFFECTS UNCLASSIFIED

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NEGOTIATING CLIMATE, THAT MEANS IT AFFECTS YOU AND HOW YOU CONDUCT THE NEGOTIATIONS.

A: WELL, LET ME BE MORE SPECIFIC..

WE NOTED THAT AT THE INDIAN OCEAN TALKS -- AND THIS WAS ON THE STATEMENT I PUT OUT, WHAT, A WEEK AGO -- THAT THERE WE HAD, IN FACT, RAISED IT, THE HORN ACTIVITIES, AND HAD NOTED AT THAT TIME THAT IT WAS, IN FACT, AN IMPEDIMENT TO PROGRESS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN TALKS.

NOW, IT IS NOT COMMON TO THAT IN THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS DIRECTLY AND I AM NOT EVEN SUGGESTING IT NOR IS DR. BRZEZINSKI SUGGESTING IT. HOWEVER, ALL HE IS SUGGESTING AND ALL THAT THE SECRETARY TRIED TO SAY IS THAT YOU CANNOT IGNORE THE EFFECT THAT THIS KIND OF ACTIVITY WILL HAVE ON THE GENERAL CLIMATE IN WHICH NEGOTIATIONS ARE TAKING PLACE AND ON THE GENERAL CLIMATE WHICH WILL GREET AN AGREEMENT.

Q: WHAT YOU ARE SAYING IS YOU ARE SAYING TO THE RUSSIANS ESSENTIALLY THAT THIS IS MAKING IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR YOU OR FOR US, THE UNITED STATES, TO NEGOTIATE A SALT AGREEMENT: ISN'T IT?

A: WE ARE SAYING THAT THE ACTIVITY IN THE HORN OF AFRICA HAS EFFECTS WHICH GO BEYOND THE HORN AND AMONG THOSE, OBVIOUSLY, HAS THE EFFECT ON THE CLIMATE IN THIS COUNTRY.

Q: HODDING, DID THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE ANY ADVANCE NOTICE THAT THE VICE PRESIDENT OR DR. BRZEZINSKI WAS GOING TO BE SPEAKING OUT ON THIS SUBJECT TODAY? UNCLASSIFIED

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A: I DON'T KNOW ABOUT THAT.

I WOULD SAY, HOWEVER, THAT THERE IS AND HAS BEEN A GREAT DEAL OF CONVERSATION AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS ON THIS

PARTICULAR POINT AND THE POINT DR. BRZEZINSKI WAS MAKING REFLECTS ONE WHICH, AS I REPEAT, THE SECRETARY SAID IN ROUGHLY SIMILAR LANGUAGE RECENTLY.

Q: DR. BRZEZINSKI ALWAYS SEEMED TO SPEAK OUT MUCH MORE STRONGLY AND STRIDENTLY THAN THE SECRETARY DOES ON THIS ISSUE, ON THESE ISSUES.

A: YES.

I BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT MR. VANCE AND MR. BRZEZINSKI UNDERSTAND EACH OTHER AND UNDERSTAND THAT THEY ARE SPEAKING ON THE SAME POLICY.

Q: DOES THIS ADMINISTRATION SEE ANY DIFFERENCE IN THE FUNDAMENTAL APPROACH IT IS TAKING TO U.S. SOVIET POLICY THAN THE PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION DID, AND, IF SO, WHERE DOES IT EXIST?

A: MY PROBLEM WITH THE QUESTION IS, ONE, I HAVE NOT EVER ATTEMPTED, AND I AM NOT NOW GOING TO DO, TO SORT OF SET DOWN A LIST OF THOSE AREAS IN WHICH WE ARE DIFFERENT FROM OR SIMILAR TO THE LAST ADMINISTRATION. WHAT I HAVE TRIED TO DO IS SAY WHAT OUR POLICY IS.

NOW, IF SOMEBODY HAS GIVEN YOU BACKGROUNDERS TELLING YOU THAT WE ARE A NEW AND VIRGIN ADMINISTRATION DOING

THINGS TOTALLY DIFFERENT FROM SOME OTHER ADMINISTRATION, GO TO THEM FOR A CLARIFICATION ON THAT. I REALLY DON'T HAVE A COMPARATIVE THING TO OFFER YOU, MURREY. I CAN UNCLASSIFIED

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ONLY TELL YOU WHAT WE ARE DOING.

Q: WILL THIS POLITICAL LINKAGE AFFECT THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS? YOU INDICATE THAT IT WILL.

A:I DO NOT SEE THAT HAPPENING, MURREY, AT THIS POINT. I SEE US NEGOTIATING IN GOOD FAITH. AND, AS SOMEONE SAID AS RECENTLY AS THE LAST MONTH, AND THEREFORE I HAVE A LITTLE DIFFICULTY WITH THERMOMETERS AGAIN AS TO THE MEASUREMENT OF HOW WE ARE TODAY -- THERE HAS BEEN IN THE LAST MONTH AND A HALF SOME SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS, AND THERE ARE STILL TOUGH ISSUES, AND I DON'T KNOW THE EXACT PHRASEOLOGY DR. BRZEZINSKI USED, BUT THERE ARE STILL TOUGH ISSUES THAT HAVE TO BE RESOLVED.

Q: THEN WHAT IS THE POINT OF THE CURRENT WARNING, IF IT IS NOT GOING TO HAVE ANY EFFECT ON THE UNITED STATES CONSIDERATION -- ?

A: THE POINT OF THE CURRENT WARNING, I THINK, IS TO STATE THE OBVIOUS, AND TO STATE IT PUBLICLY. AND I DON'T

KNOW WHAT IS MORE OBVIOUS THAN THE EFFECT THAT THIS, IN FACT, IS GOING TO HAVE.

Q: HAS THIS OBVIOUS FACT BEEN MADE PART OF THE PROTEST THAT WE HAVE BEEN MAKING TO THE SOVIET UNION, OR IS THIS THE FIRST TIME THAT --?

A: AGAIN, I REPEAT, I MEAN, THE SECRETARY SAID IN DIFFERENT WORDS THE SAME THING NOT LONG AGO.

Q: I AM TRYING TO GET A SENSE OF THE DEGREE, OF THE UNCLASSIFIED

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TIMING ON THIS. WHEN DID THIS OBVIOUS FACT BECOME SO OBVIOUS? I HAVE A SENSE THAT A MONTH AGO WE WERE PROTESTING THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN THE HORN AND THE CUBAN PRESENCE IN THE HORN, AND WE WEREN'T MAKING THIS POINT, ALTHOUGH THE SECRETARY DID IT LAST WEEK, AND DR. BRZEZINSKI DID IT TODAY.

WHEN DID WE BEGIN TO SENSE THAT THERE WOULD BE A POLITICAL PROBLEM?

A: LET ME JUST SAY THAT IN THE LAST MONTH, SEVERAL THINGS HAVE HAPPENED. ONE HAS BEEN A HUNDRED PERCENT OR BETTER INCREASE IN THE SIZE OF THE CUBAN PRESENCE IN ETHIOPIA. ANOTHER HAS BEEN THE CLEAR EVIDENCE OF A DIRECT COMBAT ROLE BY THE CUBANS. ANOTHER HAS BEEN THE ROLE THAT IS BEING PLAYED IN THAT SITUATION BY SOVIET ADVISORS.

ALL OF THIS SIMPLY HAS MADE WHAT WAS A SITUATION ABOUT WHICH WE HAD PROTESTED EARLIER OF GREATER DIMENSIONS. IT IS A FACT THAT THE DIMENSIONS ARE CONSIDERABLY GREATER.

Q: THEN, WHY WON'T YOU GO THE LAST STEP AND SAY THAT IF THIS CONTINUES, IT IS GOING TO HAVE AN EFFECT?

A: BECAUSE, IN FACT, WE DON'T HAVE A POLICY OF LINKAGE.

Q: HAVE YOU MADE THE POINT THAT BRZEZINSKI MADE PUBLICLY TODAY -- HAVE YOU MADE THAT POINT PRIVATELY, OR WAS IT DONE BY -- WAS THE SUGGESTION MADE BY THE SECRETARY? THE OBVIOUS?

A: I KNOW. I AM CONFIDENT THAT POINT HAS BEEN MADE TO THE SOVIET UNION PRIVATELY.

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Q: HODDING, IF THERE MAY BE A POLITICAL TIE-IN WITH

SALT CONCERNING SOVIET AND CUBAN ACTIVITIES IN THE HORN OF AFRICA, COULD YOU TELL US WHY SPECIFICALLY THOSE ACTIVITIES BOTHER THE UNITED STATES?

A: YES, BECAUSE WE HAVE FELT AND HAVE SAID FOR A LONG TIME THAT THIS IS A REGIONAL CONFLICT; THAT IT SHOULD AND COULD BEST BE HANDLED BY BOTH THE PEOPLE IN THE REGION AND BY THE MEDIATION EFFORTS OF THE OAU, HEADED BY NIGERIA. AND THAT THE ENTRY OF LARGE OUTSIDE FORCE UNITS BOTH RAISES THE LEVEL OF CONFLICT AND RAISES THE SPECTER OF AN ENLARGED ENGAGEMENT IN WHICH OTHER OUTSIDE FORCES MIGHT ALSO BECOME INVOLVED.

## Q: INCLUDING AMERICAN?

A: WE HAVE EXPRESSLY, OF COURSE, SAID THAT WE HAVE NO PLANS OR INTENTIONS TO BE INVOLVED, AND WILL NOT BE. NONETHELESS, YOU HAVE SEEN ENOUGH SPECULATION ABOUT OTHER PEOPLE'S CONCERNS ABOUT THE AREA TO UNDERSTAND WHAT OUR CONCERN IS AS THIS KIND OF INVOLVEMENT BUILDS UP AND CONTINUES.

Q: HOW CAN YOU CALL IT AN INTRUSION BY THE SOVIET UNION,

AS YOU DID IN YOUR INITIAL REMARKS, WHEN THEY WERE IN-VITED?

A: I AM PERFECTLY AWARE OF THE INVITATION. WE ARE ALSO SIMPLY MAKING WHAT WE BELIEVE IS A FACTUAL STATEMENT. IT IS CERTAINLY A STATEMENT OF POLICY THAT INVITATION UNCLASSIFIED

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OR NOT, THAT LARGE OF OUTSIDE FORCE INVOLVED IN A REGIONAL CONFLICT CAN, AND WE ARE AFRAID INEVITABLY, COULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF INTERNATIONALIZING A REGIONAL CONFLICT, OF ENLARGING IT.

- Q: COULD I FOLLOW UP ON THAT POINT? THE CUBANS HAVE BEEN ENLARGING THEIR FORCES THERE, BUT THE RUSSIANS HAVE NOT. DO YOU MAKE ANY DISTINCTION IN THE TWO?
- A: WELL, OF COURSE THEY DID.
- Q: WHAT IS THE LAST RUSSIAN FIGURE?
- A: THE LAST RUSSIAN FIGURE IS ABOUT 1,000 PLUS. IT

IS NOT SIGNIFICANTLY MORE.

Q: I WANT TO ASK A VARIATION OF MARVIN'S QUESTION. HOW SOVIET/CUBAN INVOLVEMENT AFFECTS U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS?

A: I AM NOT THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ADVISOR, NOR AM I THE SECRETARY, AND MY PROBLEM IS THAT AT A GIVEN POINT, I AM NOT THE PERSON TO GIVE A DISCOURSE ON SORT OF A GLOBAL THINK ON THIS, AND I DON'T HAVE SOMETHING DOWN ON IT.

OBVIOUSLY WE HAVE CONCERNS ABOUT OUR INTERESTS, OUR ALLIES' AND FRIENDS' INTERESTS, SOME OF WHOM FEEL RATHER STRONGLY ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF SUPPLY ROUTES AND THE LIKE.

Q: YOU SAY SUPPLY ROUTES. I WAS JUST GOING TO ASK YOU A QUESTION, WHETHER THE DEEP CONCERN HERE IS THE POSSIBILITY OF A CUT-OFF OF OIL SUPPLY ROUTES?

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A: AGAIN, AT THIS POINT I AM JUST GOING TO HAVE

TO SAY I WILL BE HAPPY TO EITHER TRY TO TAKE A QUESTION AND GET IT ANSWERED. I AM NOT GOING TO NOW VENTURE MUCH FURTHER INTO TRYING TO SAY WHAT I DON'T IN FACT HAVE THE GUIDANCE DOWN HERE ON.

Q: GIVE US A PIECE OF PAPER ON GEORGE'S QUESTION, PLEASE?

A: I WILL SEE WHAT I CAN GET ON THAT.

Q: IT DOES SEEM TO ME THAT THE UNITED STATES AT SOME POINT HERE SHOULD EXPLAIN WHY ITS OBJECTIONS TO SOVIET INVITATION, CUBAN INVITATION, TO ETHIOPIA IS LOGICALLY, AND FROM A POSITIVE STANDPOINT, DIFFERENT FROM THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE INVITATION TO THE UNITED STATES, TO SOUTH KOREA, TO MANY FORCES, TO COME INTO SOUTH VIET-NAM.

A: YES.

Q: HODDING, YOU ARE MAKING A DISTINCTION THAT I WANT TO ASK YOU ABOUT, WHEN YOU SAID THAT THE ENTRY OF LARGE OUTSIDE FORCE UNITS RAISES THE SPECTER OF AN ENLARGED ENGAGEMENT WHICH OTHER POWERS MIGHT BECOME INVOLVED IN.

IN THE PAST, YOU HAVE SAID THAT ONLY AN INVASION OF SOMALIA WOULD RAISE THE SPECTER OF OTHER OUTSIDE FORCES. NOW YOU ARE SAYING THAT JUST SIMPLY THE SOVIET-CUBAN BUILD-UP --

A: OBVIOUSLY THAT SIMPLY MEANS THAT THE STAKES GET THAT MUCH HIGHER. THAT IS WHAT I AM TRYING TO SAY. NO, THE INVASION CLEARLY IS WHAT RAISES -- AN INVASION -- WHICH BOTH ETHIOPIANS AND THE RUSSIANS HAVE SAID IS NOT INTENDED UNCLASSIFIED

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AND WON'T HAPPEN. BUT THAT WOULD CLEARLY HAVE TO --

Q: DO YOU HAVE CONCERNS NOW THAT WITHOUT SUCH AN INVASION THAT SIMPLY OTHER OUTSIDE POWERS MIGHT GET INVOLVED BECAUSE OF THE ALARMING BUILD-UP?

A: NO, I WOULD NOT SUGGEST WHAT OTHER POWERS MAY OR MAY NOT DO. I AM SIMPLY SAYING --

Q: I ASKED YOU ABOUT CONCERNS.

A: NO, WAIT A MINUTE. WITH THE ENTRY OF MAJOR OUTSIDE FORCES INTO A VOLATILE SITUATION IN WHICH THERE IS ALREADY CONFLICT, THE CONCERN HAS GOT TO BE THAT YOU ARE THEN CONSIDERABLY ENLARGING THE POTENTIAL BY THE MERE FACT OF THAT PRESENCE AND THE POTENTIAL FOR AN ENLARGED CONFLICT.

NOW, I AM NOT SUGGESTING THAT PEOPLE ARE GOING TO START FIGHTING -- OUTSIDE FORCES ARE GOING TO GO IN THEIR FIGHTING OVER THE OGADEN.

Q: HODDING, BUT WHAT YOU ARE SUGGESTING, WHEN YOU TALK ABOUT INTERNATIONALIZING THE CONFLICT, THERE ARE NOT TOO MANY MAJOR POWERS TO IMAGINE. AREN'T YOU COMING CLOSE TO SUGGESTING THAT IF THE RUSSIANS KEEP IT UP, WE MIGHT HAVE TO DO SOMETHING?

A: NO.

Q: WELL, THE SECRETARY HIMSELF HAS SUGGESTED THAT IF THEY CROSS THE BORDER, WE MIGHT HAVE TO ARM SOMALIA.

A: YOU SAID "KEEP IT UP."

Q: I AM FOLLOWING UP JOHN'S QUESTION. YOU HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT INTERNATIONALIZING THE CONFLICT. THE RUS-UNCLASSIFIED

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SIANS ARE THERE ALREADY. WHO ELSE MIGHT JUMP IN? US?

A: NOW, IN A DIFFERENT CONTEXT, BARRY, YOU ASKED ME A WHOLE SERIES OF QUESTIONS ABOUT WHAT WE THOUGHT EGYPTIANS AND OTHERS MIGHT BE DOING WITH WEAPONRY.

THEY HAVE EXPRESSED THEIR CONCERN. INTERNATIONALIZING DOES NOT MEAN ONLY THE POSSIBILITY OF BIG POWERS. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF PEOPLE WHO HAVE PUBLICLY EXPRESSED THEIR CONCERN ABOUT IT AND EXPRESSED WHAT THEIR INTENTIONS MIGHT BE IF SUCH-AND-SUCH A THING HAPPENED.

WHAT WE ARE TRYING TO DO IS TO BRING DOWN THE POSSIBILITY OF THOSE THINGS HAPPENING, AND AMONG THE WAYS WE BELIEVE WE MINIMIZE IT IS TO MINIMIZE AND REDUCE AND FINALLY REMOVE THE SOVIET AND CUBAN PRESENCE IN THAT PARTICULAR CONFLICT.

Q: HODDING, ARE THERE ANY CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE UNITED STATES (TO USE VANCE'S PHRASE) MIGHT REASSES ITS POLICY ON ARMS TO SOMALIA, OTHER THAN AN INVASION OF SOMALIA ITSELF?

A: THERE IS NO INTENTION OR PLANNING THAT I KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT TO CHANGE THAT POLICY OF OFFERING ARMS TO SOMALIA.

Q: IN OTHER WORDS, THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS COULD SEND AS MANY ADVISORS AS THEY WOULD LIKE, TO ETHIOPIA. THAT IS NOT GOING TO CHANGE?

A: WAIT A MINUTE, I AM NOT GOING TO MAKE ANY FUTURE TENSE SPECULATIVE KIND OF THING. I AM SIMPLY TELLING YOU THAT

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THERE IS NO PRESENT INTENTION, PLANNING OR WHAT HAVE YOU FOR SENDING ARMS TO SOMALIA.

Q: HODDING, A RELATED QUESTION:

HAS THE UNITED STATES ASSURED KENYA OF ITS CURRENT POLICY ON ARMS TO SOMALIA -- THAT WE WILL NOT --

A: I AM SURE THAT WE WILL MAKE THAT CLEAR.

Q: THERE IS A DELEGATION HERE?

A: YES, HERE, AS I RECALL.

Q: IS THAT THEIR PURPOSE FOR COMING?

A: THEY ARE CERTAINLY HERE TO DISCUSS WITH US BOTH EVENTS IN THE HORN AND THE BILATERAL MATTERS, AS WELL. I MEAN, BOTH OF THOSE WILL ARISE.

LET ME SUGGEST THAT I DO BELIEVE THERE WILL PROBABLY BE SOME KIND OF A STATEMENT AFTER THEY HAVE COMPLETED THEIR MEETINGS. AND THEY ARE MEETING, AS I RECALL, WITH THE

SECRETARY, THE VICE PRESIDENT -- I HAVE A LIST HERE, AS A MATTER OF FACT.

Q: AND THE PRESIDENT?

A: IS THE ARMS POLICY BEING REASSESSED?

A: TO SOMALIA? NO.

Q: HODDING, DOES YOUR "NO LINKAGE" STATEMENT ALSO APPLY TO THE TALKS ON THE INDIAN OCEAN?

A: NO. AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE INDIAN OCEAN TALKS, SINCE UNCLASSIFIED

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THE MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IMPINGE ON THE INDIAN OCEAN, WE HAVE IN FACT -- AND I THINK I HAVE SAID THIS IN A STATEMENT NOT LONG AGO -- RAISED THAT QUESTION IN THOSE INDIAN OCEAN TALKS AND HAVE SAID THAT IN FACT IT DOES HAVE AN EFFECT ON THOSE TALKS.

Q: HAVEN'T THE INDIAN OCEAN TALKS, IN FACT, BEEN BROKEN OFF?

A: "BROKEN OFF" IS PROBABLY THE WRONG TERM THOUGH THEY ARE IN A RECESS -- BUT THEY DO THAT PERIODICALLY. I DON'T THINK THAT THIS HASTENED THAT, BUT I AM NOT SURE.

Q: YOU SAY THAT WE ARE SUPPORTING THE EFFORTS OF THE OAU TO FIND A SOLUTION.

A: YES.

Q: THIS HAS NOT BEEN MUCH OF A SUCCESS. IN FACT, THERE APPEARS TO BE LITTLE OR NO PROGRESS. ARE WE DOING ANYTHING ELSE? DO WE HAVE ANY PLANS TO DO SOMETHING SHOULD THAT FAIL?

A: WE HAVE, OF COURSE, TALKED TO A NUMBER OF OUR FRIENDS AND ASSOCIATES -- BUT FRANKLY, OUR FIRST LINE AND OUR FIRST HOPE AND OUR MAJOR EMPHASIS IS ON THE OAU EFFORT, HEADEDBY THE NIGERIANS.

Q: HODDING, COULD I JUST FOLLOW THAT UP?

MORE SPECIFICALLY, IS THERE NO PRESENT HOPE OF TWO THINGS:

ONE, IS THERE A POSSIBILITY OF PERSUADING THE SOMALI UNCLASSIFIED

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GOVERNMENT TO WITHDRAW FROM THE OGADEN? AMBASSADOR LUGHRAN HAS BEEN BACK AND FORTH A COUPLE OF TIMES RECENTLY, AND PRESUMABLY SINCE WE STILL IDENTIFY THE SOMALIS AS THE AGGRESSORS. WE WOULD LIKE HIM TO LEAVE ---

AND TWO, IS THERE NO INCLINATION OR PLANNING HERE TO MOVE THE CENTER OF ARBITRATION IN THIS AFFAIR FROM THE OAU TO THE UNITED NATIONS?

A: WELL THAT FRANKLY, SUCH A MOVE AS THE LATTER, WOULD BE ONE WHICH WOULD ONLY BE SUPPORTED, I THINK IF IN FACT THE OAU AND THAT PARTICULAR ARBITRATION GROUP, IN PARTICULAR, WISHED TO DO SO

IN THE ABSENCE OF SUCH A --

Q: ISN'T THAT A LOGICAL POSSIBILITY?

A: WELL THAT, I THINK, WILL HAVE TO BE ADDRESSED TO THEM. WE ARE NOT GOING TO SUGGEST PUBLICLY WHAT THE OAU SHOULD, OR SHOULDN'T DO IN THIS KIND OF THING.

WE BELIEVE THAT THEIR MISSION IS VERY IMPORTANT.

NOW THE FIRST QUESTION, HOWEVER, HAD TO DO WITH WHETHER OR NOT WE AREN'T INTERESTED IN FACTS. WE ARE.

Q: AND DO WE HAVE ANY PROSPECTS OF SUCCEEDING?

A: WELL I AM NOT GOING TO GO INTO THE SUBJECT MATTER OF ANY DISCUSSIONS WE HAVE WITH THE SOMALIS AND OTHERS. I WOULD JUST SIMPLY SAY THAT WHAT WE HAVE SAID PUBLICLY ON THIS SUBJECT -- THATWE HAVEMADE THAT CLEAR PRIVATELY, AS WELL.

Q: IS IT CORRECT THAT YOU ARE ASKING THE RUSSIANS TO RE-UNCLASSIFIED

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DUCE THEIR FORCES IN ETHIOPIA -- BUT NOT ASKING THEM TO GET OUT OF ETHIOPIA?

A: WELL, WHAT WE REALLY HOPE, OBVIOUSLY, IS THAT ALL OUTSIDE FORCES BE REMOVED, AND THAT THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF ETHIOPIA BE RESPECTED -- THAT THE CONFLICT BE ENDED -- AND ALL OF THOSE THINGS, I THINK, ARE SIMULTANEOUSLY PART OF OUR OVERALL OBJECTIVE.

Q: WITHIN THE LIFE OF THIS PRESENT ADMINISTRATION WE HAVE SEEN THE UNITED STATES APPLAUDING THE INTERVENTION OF THE UNITED STATES AND FRANCE, IN ZAIRE, UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES ALMOST PRECISELY PARALLEL WITH THOSE THAT EXIST IN ETHIOPIA --

A: WELL, LET ME JUST DEAL WITH THE CONSISTENCY LINE ON ETHIOPIA, AND JUST SAY THAT THAT IS THE POLICY.

Q: RIGHT. COULD YOU GO OVER THAT DOTTED LINE THAT YOU SAY IS A BORDER AND SAY WHETHER YOU FEEL THE EGYPTIANS, THE IRANIANS, THE SUDANESE AND ALL SHOULD STOP THEIR ASSISTANCE TO SOMALIA? I DON'T KNOW IF YOU ACCEPT THE PREMISE, BUT AT LEAST PRIVATELY THE ADMINISTRATION DOES ACKNOWLEDGE SOMALIA AS THE AGGRESSOR.

A: LOO:, WHAT I HAVE SAID AND WHAT I CONTINUE TO SAY IS THAT WE SUPPORT THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF ETHIOPIA AND WE BELIEVE THAT ALL OUTSIDE FORCES THERE SHOULD IN FACT NOT BE THERE.

Q: WELL, HOW ABOUT OUTSIDE FORCES IN SOMALIA? SHOULD THEY BE THERE?

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A: LET ME DEAL WITH THAT WHEN IT BECOMES A PROBLEM. I DON'T HAVE ANY --

Q: YOU MEAN THE EGYPTIANS AND THE IRANIANS AREN'T PUMPING AID INTO IT? I DON'T SUPPOSE THEY JUST DROP OFF THE EQUIPMENT AND RACE FOR THE NEAREST AIRPORT TO GET OUT OF TOWN.

A: I THINK I'VE SPOKEN ON THIS WHOLE SUBJECT BEFORE.

 $\mathbf{Q}\!\!:\!\mathbf{I}$  JUST WANTED TO MAKE IT PARALLEL AND CONSISTENT AND LINK THIS.

Q: YOU'RE NOT SURELY SUGGESTING THAT THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF ETHIOPIA IS BEING VIOLATED BY CUBA AND THE SOVIET UNION, NO OTHER PARTY, SO THE ONLY VIOLATOR OF THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY IS SOMALIA.

A: I AM SAYING THAT WHAT WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO DO IS TO SEE TO IT THAT THAT TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY IS RESTORED. I'M NOT GOING TO START ITEMIZING EVERYONE WHO'S INVOLVED. WE HAVE, HOWEVER, SAID IN THE PAST THE REASON WE RECONSIDERED OUR TENTATIVE OFFER OF ARMS, IF YOU RECALL, TO SOMALIA WAS PRECISELY BECAUSE OF THE INVOLVEMENT IN THAT CONFLICT. O.K.?

Q: HODDING, BACK TO THE OAU MISSION, A FEW WEEKS AGO WE HEARD THAT THERE WERE SOME PRELIMINARY INDICATIONS THAT THEY HAD MADE SOME PROGRESS. NOW, OF COURSE, THAT DOESN'T SEEM TO HAVE BEEN BORNE OUT BY THE FACTS. WHAT IS THE STATE OF THE OAU MEDIATION RIGHT NOW?

A: I THINK I'M GOING TO HAVE TO TAKE THE QUESTION.

I BELIEVE THEY MADE VISITS RECENTLY TO BOTH COUNTRIES. I AM NOT SURE AT THIS POINT WHERE WE ARE.

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Q: HODDING, TO GO BACK TO THE BASIC POLICY, YOU SAY IT IS A MATTER OF POLICY NOT TO HAVE LINKAGE BETWEEN SALT AND SOVIET BEHAVIOR ELSEWHERE. IS THAT POLICY ITSELF UNDER CHALLENGE IN THE ADMINISTRATION? IS THERE SOME THOUGHT TO RECONSIDERING THE POLICY?

A: I'M NOT AWARE OF ANY. I'M NOT AWARE OF A RECONSIDERATION OF THAT. I BELIEVE THAT THE LINKAGE THING REMAINS. I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THAT'S A SUBJECT OF RECONSIDERATION.

Q: HODDING, I ASKED THREE TIMES JUST TO BE SPECIFIC. WHEN YOU SAY "ALL OUTSIDE FORCES, YOU'RE INCLUDING SOMALI FORCES; RIGHT?

A: I AM SUGGESTING THAT WE BELIEVE THAT THE ULIMATE END OF THAT CONFLICT SHOULD BE THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF ETHIOPIA AND, IN FACT, WE BELIEVE THAT THE OVERALL PRINCIPLE HAS TO BE RESPECT FOR THE INTEGRITY OF THE TERRITORY OF ALL THE COUNTRIES THERE, AS IN FACT ANYWHERE ELSE, AND THAT OBVIOUSLY WE RUN THAT BOTH WAYS -- WHICH IS WHAT THE CONCERN WAS THAT WAS RAISED IN THE PAST.

Q: I UNDERSTAND THAT. AREN'T YOU CALLING ON THE SOMALIS TO WITHDRAW?

A: I AM NOT WRITING THAT LEAD. I HAVE REALLY SAID REPEATEDLY WHAT IT IS WE WANT. I AM JUST NOT GOING BEYOND THAT.

Q: WELL: HAVEN'T THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY SPECIFICALLY CALLED FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOMALIAN FORCES?

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A: WE HAVE DONE IT EVERY TIME, BUT THAT ISN'T FOR ME TO DO UP HERE TODAY.

Q: WE HAVE SAID, AND YOU HAVE SAID HERE REPEATEDLY TODAY, THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT SEND ARMS TO SOMALIA. HAVE WE ADVISED OUR STAUNCHEST ALLIES -- EGYPT, SAUDIA ARABIA, AND OTHER -- ALSO TO REFRAIN FROM SENDING ARMS TO SOMALIA?

A: JOE, HONEST TO GOODNESS, I'VE BEEN AROUND THIS ONE I THINK THREE OF FOUR TIMES. THE ANSWER IS WE HAVE MADE KNOWN PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY WHAT OUR POLICY IS AND OUR CONCERNS ABOUT THE PROVISION OF MATERIAL, MEN -- ANYTHING WHICH FUELS THE CONFLICT.

Q: WELL, NO. WHAT I'M ASKING YOU IS WHETHER WE HAVE SPECIFICALLY ASKED THESE TWO GOVERNMENT, OR OTHER GOVERNMENT WHO ARE SENDING SUPPLIES INTO SOMALIA, NOT TO DO IT. THIS IS ALL I'M ASKING. HAVE WE DONE THIS?

A: JOE, I HAVE SAID BEFORE THAT WE HAVE SPOKEN TO A NUMBER -- I'M NOT GOING TO SPECIFY -- OF GOVERNMENTS AND MADE OUR POLICY CLEAR AND MADE CLEAR TO THEM WHAT WE THINK IS THE PROPER COURSE OF ACTION. THE ANSWER, THEREFORE, TO YOU IS YES. BUT I'M NOT GONG TO SAY YES TO A, B, C NATIONS.

Q: WELL, LET ME JUST FOLLOW THIS UP WITH A SITUATION THAT EVOLVES IN THE SENATE IN WHICH SENATOR EAGLETON URGES TRANSFER OF U.S. ARMS TO SOMALIA. DOES THE ADMINISTRATION SUPPORT SENATOR EAGLETON'S POSITION?

A: HE ADVOCATES THE TRANSFER OF ARMS TO SOMALIA? I'VE JUST SAID WHAT THE ADMINISTRATION'S POSITION IS.

Q: ALL RIGHT. NOW, SENATOR MOYNIHAN HAS QUITE A DIFFERENT UNCLASSIFIED

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VIEW, AND HE REFERS TO SOMALIA AS "ARROGANT, RUTHLESS."

"SOMALIA PROUD TO BE THE WHORE OF RUSSIA AND PROUD OF ITS ASSOCIATION WITH CUBA." HE OPPOSES ANY SUPPORT FOR SOMALIA. WHAT DO WE THINK OF THAT?

A: WE HAVE A POLICY WHICH IS WE'RE NOT GOING TO GIVE ANY ARMS SUPPORT TO SOMALIA. VANCE

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FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 052898 ACTION ALL AFRICAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS, LONDON, PARIS, BONN, NSC, CIA, DOD, JCS AND USIA MAR 01.

QUOTE: UNCLAS STATE 052898

E.O. 11652:N/A

TAGS: PFOR

SUBJECT: DEPARTMENT OF STATE PRESS BRIEFING MARCH 1, 1978

FOLLOWING ARE EXCERPTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE NOON BRIEFING, MARCH 1, 1978:

Q: ASSUMING YOU'RE AWARE OF DR. BRZEZINSKI'S REMARKS THIS MORNING, WHAT IMPACT, IF ANY, DOES SOVIET ACTIVITY IN AFRICA HAVE ON THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS?

A: I SAW WHAT HE SAID, AND I'VE BEEN FURNISHED A TRANS-CRIPT OF IT. I DON'T THINK IT TAKES US BEYOND WHAT I BELIEVE THE SECRETARY AND PERHAPS OTHER ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS HAVE SAID, WHICH IS THAT, ONE, WE DO NOT HAVE A LINKAGE, WE DO NOT ESTABLISH A LINKAGE OURSELVES BETWEEN UNCLASSIFIED

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SALT AND ANY OTHER ASPECT OF POLICY. THAT IS, WE THINK THAT THE ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST SALT TREATY NEGOTIATIONS AND WHAT-HAVE-YOU STAND ON THEIR OWN.

WHAT HE WAS SAYING WAS ANOTHER WAY OF SAYING WHAT WE DO THINK IS OBVIOUS, THAT EVENTS SUCH AS THE INTRUSION INTO THE HORN HAVE AN OBVIOUS AND INEVITABLE POLITICAL EFFECT WHICH CAN SPILL OVER AND MAY WELL SPILL OVER INTO OTHER ASPECTS OF POLICY, AND IN THIS CASE, DR. BRZEZINSKI IS

SPECIFICALLY SPEAKING OF ITS POSSIBLE EFFECT ON SALT.

LET ME JUST SAY THAT AS A MATTER OF POLICY THERE IS NO LINKAGE. AS A MATTER OF JUST INEVITABLE POLITICAL EFFECT, THE EVENTS IN THE HORN, AS THE SECRETARY I THINK SAID, EITHER IN A NEWS CONFERENCE OR AT SOME POINT RECENTLY, ARE BOUND TO AFFECT THE POLITICAL CLIMATE IN WHICH BOTH THE NEGOTIATIONS MUST BE CARRIED ON AND AN AGREEMENT MUST EVENTUALLY BE CONSIDERED, THAT IS TO SAY, RATIFIED.

Q: WELL, HODDING, THE MESSAGE DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE GETTING THROUGH VERY WELL BECAUSE ACCORDING TO THE

FIGURES THAT YOU PUT OUT MONDAY AFTERNOON, THERE ARE NOW, 37,000 CUBANS IN AFRICA, PRESUMABLY WITH SOVIET HELP AND CONSENT, AND MORE ARE ON THE WAY AND ARE EXPECTED TO ARRIVE MOMENTARILY. SO WHAT CONCLUSIONS DO YOU DRAW FROM THESE TWO EVENTS?

A: THERE IS A FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION ON THIS SUBJECT THAT WE HAVE FOUND IN OUR EXPLORATIONS PRIVATELY AS WELL AS PUBLICLY, AND THAT DIFFERENCE HAS BECOME CLEAR.

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Q: AND YOU CONTINUE TO MAKE YOUR VIEWPOINT CLEAR DIRECTLY TO THEM --

A: YES, WE DO.

Q: -- APART FROM FORUMS SUCH AS THIS. HOW?

A: IN CONVERSATIONS AT THE AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL, AND I THINK YOU ARE AWARE OF MEETINGS THAT TAKE PLACE RATHER REGULARLY.

Q: DOES THEIR BEHAVIOR SEEM TO SUGGEST THE MESSAGE IS GETTING THROUGH? DO YOU THINK THERE WOULD BE TWICE AS MANY RUSSIANS THERE IF YOU WEREN'T TALKING TO THEM?

A: THERE ARE TWO DIFFERENT QUESTIONS. I'M WILLING TO CONCEDE, AND IT'S OBVIOUS ON ITS FACE, THAT ACTIVITIES ARE CONTINUING WHICH WE ARE PROTESTING. THEREFORE, THEY'RE NOT AGREEING WITH THE MESSAGE. NOW, "IS THE MESSAGE GETTING THROUGH?" YES, THEY ARE HEARING THE MESSAGE. THERE IS NO WAY FOR THEM NOT TO BE HEARING IT.

Q: HODDING, IF I CAN UNDERSTAND YOUR EXPLANATION, WHAT YOU'RE SAYING IS, AS A MATTER OF POLICY THERE IS NO LINKAGE, BUT AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, THERE IS LINKAGE?

A: THERE MAY WELL BE SUCHHLINKAGE. THAT IS TO SAY THERE MAY WELL BE THE POLITICAL EFFECT AND THAT IS JUST

SORT OF LIKE STATING THE OBVIOUS.

Q: WELL, IT IS NOT THE OBVIOUS. IF YOU SAY IT AFFECTS NEGOTIATING CLIMATE, THAT MEANS IT AFFECTS YOU AND HOW YOU CONDUCT THE NEGOTIATIONS.

A: WELL, LET ME BE MORE SPECIFIC.. UNCLASSIFIED

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WE NOTED THAT AT THE INDIAN OCEAN TALKS -- AND THIS WAS ON THE STATEMENT I PUT OUT, WHAT, A WEEK AGO -- THAT THERE WE HAD, IN FACT, RAISED IT, THE HORN ACTIVITIES, AND HAD NOTED AT THAT TIME THAT IT WAS, IN FACT, AN IMPEDIMENT TO PROGRESS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN TALKS.

NOW, IT IS NOT COMMON TO THAT IN THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS DIRECTLY AND I AM NOT EVEN SUGGESTING IT NOR IS DR. BRZEZINSKI SUGGESTING IT. HOWEVER, ALL HE IS SUGGESTING AND ALL THAT THE SECRETARY TRIED TO SAY IS THAT YOU CANNOT IGNORE THE EFFECT THAT THIS KIND OF ACTIVITY WILL HAVE ON THE GENERAL CLIMATE IN WHICH NEGOTIATIONS ARE TAKING PLACE AND ON THE GENERAL CLIMATE WHICH WILL GREET AN AGREEMENT.

Q: WHAT YOU ARE SAYING IS YOU ARE SAYING TO THE RUSSIANS ESSENTIALLY THAT THIS IS MAKING IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR YOU OR FOR US, THE UNITED STATES, TO NEGOTIATE A SALT AGREEMENT; ISN'T IT?

A: WE ARE SAYING THAT THE ACTIVITY IN THE HORN OF AFRICA HAS EFFECTS WHICH GO BEYOND THE HORN AND AMONG THOSE, OBVIOUSLY, HAS THE EFFECT ON THE CLIMATE IN THIS COUNTRY.

Q: HODDING, DID THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE ANY ADVANCE NOTICE THAT THE VICE PRESIDENT OR DR. BRZEZINSKI WAS GOING TO BE SPEAKING OUT ON THIS SUBJECT TODAY?

A: I DON'T KNOW ABOUT THAT.

I WOULD SAY, HOWEVER, THAT THERE IS AND HAS BEEN A UNCLASSIFIED

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GREAT DEAL OF CONVERSATION AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS ON THIS PARTICULAR POINT AND THE POINT DR. BRZEZINSKI WAS MAKING REFLECTS ONE WHICH, AS I REPEAT, THE SECRETARY SAID IN ROUGHLY SIMILAR LANGUAGE RECENTLY.

Q: DR. BRZEZINSKI ALWAYS SEEMED TO SPEAK OUT MUCH MORE STRONGLY AND STRIDENTLY THAN THE SECRETARY DOES ON THIS ISSUE, ON THESE ISSUES.

A: YES.

I BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT MR. VANCE AND MR. BRZEZINSKI UNDERSTAND EACH OTHER AND UNDERSTAND THAT THEY ARE SPEAKING ON THE SAME POLICY.

Q: DOES THIS ADMINISTRATION SEE ANY DIFFERENCE IN THE FUNDAMENTAL APPROACH IT IS TAKING TO U.S. SOVIET POLICY

THAN THE PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION DID, AND, IF SO, WHERE DOES IT EXIST?

A: MY PROBLEM WITH THE QUESTION IS, ONE, I HAVE NOT EVER ATTEMPTED, AND I AM NOT NOW GOING TO DO, TO SORT OF SET DOWN A LIST OF THOSE AREAS IN WHICH WE ARE DIFFERENT FROM OR SIMILAR TO THE LAST ADMINISTRATION. WHAT I HAVE TRIED TO DO IS SAY WHAT OUR POLICY IS.

NOW, IF SOMEBODY HAS GIVEN YOU BACKGROUNDERS TELLING YOU THAT WE ARE A NEW AND VIRGIN ADMINISTRATION DOING

THINGS TOTALLY DIFFERENT FROM SOME OTHER ADMINISTRATION, GO TO THEM FOR A CLARIFICATION ON THAT. I REALLY DON'T HAVE A COMPARATIVE THING TO OFFER YOU, MURREY. I CAN ONLY TELL YOU WHAT WE ARE DOING.

Q: WILL THIS POLITICAL LINKAGE AFFECT THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS? YOU INDICATE THAT IT WILL. UNCLASSIFIED

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A:I DO NOT SEE THAT HAPPENING, MURREY, AT THIS POINT. I SEE US NEGOTIATING IN GOOD FAITH. AND, AS SOMEONE SAID AS RECENTLY AS THE LAST MONTH, AND THEREFORE I HAVE A LITTLE DIFFICULTY WITH THERMOMETERS AGAIN AS TO THE MEASUREMENT OF HOW WE ARE TODAY -- THERE HAS BEEN IN THE LAST MONTH AND A HALF SOME SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS, AND THERE ARE STILL TOUGH ISSUES, AND I DON'T KNOW THE EXACT PHRASEOLOGY DR. BRZEZINSKI USED, BUT THERE ARE STILL TOUGH ISSUES THAT HAVE TO BE RESOLVED.

Q: THEN WHAT IS THE POINT OF THE CURRENT WARNING, IF IT IS NOT GOING TO HAVE ANY EFFECT ON THE UNITED STATES CONSIDERATION -- ?

A: THE POINT OF THE CURRENT WARNING, I THINK, IS TO STATE THE OBVIOUS, AND TO STATE IT PUBLICLY. AND I DON'T

KNOW WHAT IS MORE OBVIOUS THAN THE EFFECT THAT THIS, IN FACT, IS GOING TO HAVE.

Q: HAS THIS OBVIOUS FACT BEEN MADE PART OF THE PROTEST THAT WE HAVE BEEN MAKING TO THE SOVIET UNION, OR IS THIS THE FIRST TIME THAT --?

A: AGAIN, I REPEAT, I MEAN, THE SECRETARY SAID IN DIFFERENT WORDS THE SAME THING NOT LONG AGO.

Q: I AM TRYING TO GET A SENSE OF THE DEGREE, OF THE TIMING ON THIS. WHEN DID THIS OBVIOUS FACT BECOME SO OBVIOUS? I HAVE A SENSE THAT A MONTH AGO WE WERE PROTESTING THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN THE HORN AND THE CUBAN

PRESENCE IN THE HORN, AND WE WEREN'T MAKING THIS POINT, UNCLASSIFIED

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ALTHOUGH THE SECRETARY DID IT LAST WEEK, AND DR. BRZEZINSKI DID IT TODAY.

WHEN DID WE BEGIN TO SENSE THAT THERE WOULD BE A POLITICAL PROBLEM?

A: LET ME JUST SAY THAT IN THE LAST MONTH, SEVERAL THINGS HAVE HAPPENED. ONE HAS BEEN A HUNDRED PERCENT OR BETTER INCREASE IN THE SIZE OF THE CUBAN PRESENCE IN ETHIOPIA. ANOTHER HAS BEEN THE CLEAR EVIDENCE OF A DIRECT COMBAT ROLE BY THE CUBANS. ANOTHER HAS BEEN THE ROLE THAT IS BEING PLAYED IN THAT SITUATION BY SOVIET ADVISORS.

ALL OF THIS SIMPLY HAS MADE WHAT WAS A SITUATION ABOUT WHICH WE HAD PROTESTED EARLIER OF GREATER DIMENSIONS. IT IS A FACT THAT THE DIMENSIONS ARE CONSIDERABLY GREATER.

Q: THEN, WHY WON'T YOU GO THE LAST STEP AND SAY THAT IF THIS CONTINUES. IT IS GOING TO HAVE AN EFFECT?

A: BECAUSE, IN FACT, WE DON'T HAVE A POLICY OF LINKAGE.

Q: HAVE YOU MADE THE POINT THAT BRZEZINSKI MADE PUBLICLY TODAY -- HAVE YOU MADE THAT POINT PRIVATELY, OR WAS IT DONE BY -- WAS THE SUGGESTION MADE BY THE SECRETARY? THE OBVIOUS?

A: I KNOW. I AM CONFIDENT THAT POINT HAS BEEN MADE TO THE SOVIET UNION PRIVATELY.

Q: HODDING, IF THERE MAY BE A POLITICAL TIE-IN WITH

SALT CONCERNING SOVIET AND CUBAN ACTIVITIES IN THE HORN UNCLASSIFIED

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OF AFRICA, COULD YOU TELL US WHY SPECIFICALLY THOSE ACTIVITIES BOTHER THE UNITED STATES?

A: YES, BECAUSE WE HAVE FELT AND HAVE SAID FOR A LONG TIME THAT THIS IS A REGIONAL CONFLICT; THAT IT SHOULD AND COULD BEST BE HANDLED BY BOTH THE PEOPLE IN THE REGION AND BY THE MEDIATION EFFORTS OF THE OAU, HEADED BY NIGERIA. AND THAT THE ENTRY OF LARGE OUTSIDE FORCE UNITS BOTH RAISES THE LEVEL OF CONFLICT AND RAISES THE

SPECTER OF AN ENLARGED ENGAGEMENT IN WHICH OTHER OUTSIDE FORCES MIGHT ALSO BECOME INVOLVED.

Q: INCLUDING AMERICAN?

A: WE HAVE EXPRESSLY, OF COURSE, SAID THAT WE HAVE NO PLANS OR INTENTIONS TO BE INVOLVED, AND WILL NOT BE. NONETHELESS, YOU HAVE SEEN ENOUGH SPECULATION ABOUT OTHER PEOPLE'S CONCERNS ABOUT THE AREA TO UNDERSTAND WHAT OUR CONCERN IS AS THIS KIND OF INVOLVEMENT BUILDS UP AND CONTINUES.

Q: HOW CAN YOU CALL IT AN INTRUSION BY THE SOVIET UNION,

AS YOU DID IN YOUR INITIAL REMARKS, WHEN THEY WERE INVITED?

A: I AM PERFECTLY AWARE OF THE INVITATION. WE ARE ALSO SIMPLY MAKING WHAT WE BELIEVE IS A FACTUAL STATEMENT. IT IS CERTAINLY A STATEMENT OF POLICY THAT INVITATION OR NOT, THAT LARGE OF OUTSIDE FORCE INVOLVED IN A REGIONAL CONFLICT CAN, AND WE ARE AFRAID INEVITABLY, COULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF INTERNATIONALIZING A REGIONAL CONFLICT, OF ENLARGING IT. UNCLASSIFIED

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Q: COULD I FOLLOW UP ON THAT POINT? THE CUBANS HAVE BEEN ENLARGING THEIR FORCES THERE, BUT THE RUSSIANS HAVE NOT. DO YOU MAKE ANY DISTINCTION IN THE TWO?

A: WELL, OF COURSE THEY DID.

Q: WHAT IS THE LAST RUSSIAN FIGURE?

A: THE LAST RUSSIAN FIGURE IS ABOUT 1,000 PLUS. IT IS NOT SIGNIFICANTLY MORE.

Q: I WANT TO ASK A VARIATION OF MARVIN'S QUESTION. HOW SOVIET/CUBAN INVOLVEMENT AFFECTS U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS?

A: I AM NOT THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ADVISOR, NOR AM I THE SECRETARY, AND MY PROBLEM IS THAT AT A GIVEN POINT, I AM NOT THE PERSON TO GIVE A DISCOURSE ON SORT OF A GLOBAL THINK ON THIS, AND I DON'T HAVE SOMETHING DOWN ON IT.

OBVIOUSLY WE HAVE CONCERNS ABOUT OUR INTERESTS, OUR ALLIES' AND FRIENDS' INTERESTS, SOME OF WHOM FEEL RATHER STRONGLY ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF SUPPLY ROUTES AND THE LIKE.

Q: YOU SAY SUPPLY ROUTES. I WAS JUST GOING TO ASK YOU A QUESTION, WHETHER THE DEEP CONCERN HERE IS THE POSSIBILITY OF A CUT-OFF OF OIL SUPPLY ROUTES?

A: AGAIN, AT THIS POINT I AM JUST GOING TO HAVE

TO SAY I WILL BE HAPPY TO EITHER TRY TO TAKE A QUESTION AND GET IT ANSWERED. I AM NOT GOING TO NOW VENTURE MUCH FURTHER INTO TRYING TO SAY WHAT I DON'T IN FACT HAVE THE UNCLASSIFIED

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GUIDANCE DOWN HERE ON.

Q: GIVE US A PIECE OF PAPER ON GEORGE'S QUESTION, PLEASE?

A: I WILL SEE WHAT I CAN GET ON THAT.

Q: IT DOES SEEM TO ME THAT THE UNITED STATES AT SOME POINT HERE SHOULD EXPLAIN WHY ITS OBJECTIONS TO SOVIET INVITATION, CUBAN INVITATION, TO ETHIOPIA IS LOGICALLY, AND FROM A POSITIVE STANDPOINT, DIFFERENT FROM THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE INVITATION TO THE UNITED STATES, TO SOUTH KOREA, TO MANY FORCES, TO COME INTO SOUTH VIET-NAM.

A: YES.

Q: HODDING, YOU ARE MAKING A DISTINCTION THAT I WANT TO ASK YOU ABOUT, WHEN YOU SAID THAT THE ENTRY OF LARGE OUTSIDE FORCE UNITS RAISES THE SPECTER OF AN ENLARGED ENGAGEMENT WHICH OTHER POWERS MIGHT BECOME INVOLVED IN.

IN THE PAST, YOU HAVE SAID THAT ONLY AN INVASION OF SOMALIA WOULD RAISE THE SPECTER OF OTHER OUTSIDE FORCES. NOW YOU ARE SAYING THAT JUST SIMPLY THE SOVIET-CUBAN BUILD-UP --

A: OBVIOUSLY THAT SIMPLY MEANS THAT THE STAKES GET THAT MUCH HIGHER. THAT IS WHAT I AM TRYING TO SAY. NO, THE INVASION CLEARLY IS WHAT RAISES -- AN INVASION -- WHICH BOTH ETHIOPIANS AND THE RUSSIANS HAVE SAID IS NOT INTENDED AND WON'T HAPPEN. BUT THAT WOULD CLEARLY HAVE TO --

Q: DO YOU HAVE CONCERNS NOW THAT WITHOUT SUCH AN INVASION THAT SIMPLY OTHER OUTSIDE POWERS MIGHT GET INVOLVED BECAUSE OF THE ALARMING BUILD-UP? UNCLASSIFIED

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A: NO, I WOULD NOT SUGGEST WHAT OTHER POWERS MAY OR MAY NOT DO. I AM SIMPLY SAYING --

Q: I ASKED YOU ABOUT CONCERNS.

A: NO, WAIT A MINUTE. WITH THE ENTRY OF MAJOR OUTSIDE FORCES INTO A VOLATILE SITUATION IN WHICH THERE IS ALREADY CONFLICT, THE CONCERN HAS GOT TO BE THAT YOU ARE THEN CONSIDERABLY ENLARGING THE POTENTIAL BY THE MERE FACT OF THAT PRESENCE AND THE POTENTIAL FOR AN ENLARGED CONFLICT.

NOW, I AM NOT SUGGESTING THAT PEOPLE ARE GOING TO START FIGHTING -- OUTSIDE FORCES ARE GOING TO GO IN THEIR FIGHTING OVER THE OGADEN.

Q: HODDING, BUT WHAT YOU ARE SUGGESTING, WHEN YOU TALK ABOUT INTERNATIONALIZING THE CONFLICT, THERE ARE NOT TOO MANY MAJOR POWERS TO IMAGINE. AREN'T YOU COMING CLOSE TO SUGGESTING THAT IF THE RUSSIANS KEEP IT UP, WE MIGHT HAVE TO DO SOMETHING?

A: NO.

Q: WELL, THE SECRETARY HIMSELF HAS SUGGESTED THAT IF THEY CROSS THE BORDER, WE MIGHT HAVE TO ARM SOMALIA.

A: YOU SAID "KEEP IT UP."

Q: I AM FOLLOWING UP JOHN'S QUESTION. YOU HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT INTERNATIONALIZING THE CONFLICT. THE RUSSIANS ARE THERE ALREADY. WHO ELSE MIGHT JUMP IN? US?

A: NOW, IN A DIFFERENT CONTEXT, BARRY, YOU ASKED ME A WHOLE SERIES OF QUESTIONS ABOUT WHAT WE THOUGHT EGYPTIANS AND OTHERS MIGHT BE DOING WITH WEAPONRY. ' UNCLASSIFIED

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THEY HAVE EXPRESSED THEIR CONCERN. INTERNATIONALIZING DOES NOT MEAN ONLY THE POSSIBILITY OF BIG POWERS. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF PEOPLE WHO HAVE PUBLICLY EXPRESSED THEIR CONCERN ABOUT IT AND EXPRESSED WHAT THEIR INTENTIONS MIGHT BE IF SUCH-AND-SUCH A THING HAPPENED.

WHAT WE ARE TRYING TO DO IS TO BRING DOWN THE POSSIBILITY OF THOSE THINGS HAPPENING, AND AMONG THE WAYS WE BELIEVE WE MINIMIZE IT IS TO MINIMIZE AND REDUCE AND FINALLY REMOVE THE SOVIET AND CUBAN PRESENCE IN THAT PARTICULAR CONFLICT.

Q: HODDING, ARE THERE ANY CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE UNITED STATES (TO USE VANCE'S PHRASE) MIGHT REASSES ITS POLICY ON ARMS TO SOMALIA, OTHER THAN AN INVASION OF SOMALIA ITSELF?

A: THERE IS NO INTENTION OR PLANNING THAT I KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT TO CHANGE THAT POLICY OF OFFERING ARMS TO SOMALIA.

Q: IN OTHER WORDS, THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS COULD SEND AS MANY ADVISORS AS THEY WOULD LIKE, TO ETHIOPIA. THAT IS NOT GOING TO CHANGE?

A: WAIT A MINUTE, I AM NOT GOING TO MAKE ANY FUTURE TENSE SPECULATIVE KIND OF THING. I AM SIMPLY TELLING YOU THAT

THERE IS NO PRESENT INTENTION, PLANNING OR WHAT HAVE YOU FOR SENDING ARMS TO SOMALIA.

Q: HODDING, A RELATED QUESTION:

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HAS THE UNITED STATES ASSURED KENYA OF ITS CURRENT POLICY ON ARMS TO SOMALIA -- THAT WE WILL NOT --

A: I AM SURE THAT WE WILL MAKE THAT CLEAR.

Q: THERE IS A DELEGATION HERE?

A: YES, HERE, AS I RECALL.

Q: IS THAT THEIR PURPOSE FOR COMING?

A: THEY ARE CERTAINLY HERE TO DISCUSS WITH US BOTH EVENTS IN THE HORN AND THE BILATERAL MATTERS, AS WELL. I MEAN, BOTH OF THOSE WILL ARISE.

LET ME SUGGEST THAT I DO BELIEVE THERE WILL PROBABLY BE SOME KIND OF A STATEMENT AFTER THEY HAVE COMPLETED THEIR MEETINGS. AND THEY ARE MEETING, AS I RECALL, WITH THE SECRETARY, THE VICE PRESIDENT -- I HAVE A LIST HERE, AS A MATTER OF FACT.

Q: AND THE PRESIDENT?

A: IS THE ARMS POLICY BEING REASSESSED?

A: TO SOMALIA? NO.

Q: HODDING, DOES YOUR "NO LINKAGE" STATEMENT ALSO APPLY TO THE TALKS ON THE INDIAN OCEAN?

A: NO. AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE INDIAN OCEAN TALKS, SINCE THE MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IMPINGE ON THE INDIAN OCEAN, WE HAVE IN FACT -- AND I THINK I HAVE SAID THIS IN A STATEMENT NOT LONG AGO -- RAISED THAT QUESTION IN THOSE INDIAN OCEAN TALKS AND HAVE SAID THAT IN FACT IT DOES HAVE AN EFFECT ON THOSE TALKS. UNCLASSIFIED

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Q: HAVEN'T THE INDIAN OCEAN TALKS, IN FACT, BEEN BROKEN OFF?

A: "BROKEN OFF" IS PROBABLY THE WRONG TERM THOUGH THEY ARE IN A RECESS -- BUT THEY DO THAT PERIODICALLY. I DON'T THINK THAT THIS HASTENED THAT. BUT I AM NOT SURE.

Q: YOU SAY THAT WE ARE SUPPORTING THE EFFORTS OF THE OAU TO FIND A SOLUTION.

A: YES.

Q: THIS HAS NOT BEEN MUCH OF A SUCCESS. IN FACT, THERE APPEARS TO BE LITTLE OR NO PROGRESS. ARE WE DOING ANYTHING ELSE? DO WE HAVE ANY PLANS TO DO SOMETHING SHOULD THAT FAIL?

A: WE HAVE, OF COURSE, TALKED TO A NUMBER OF OUR FRIENDS AND ASSOCIATES -- BUT FRANKLY, OUR FIRST LINE AND OUR FIRST HOPE AND OUR MAJOR EMPHASIS IS ON THE OAU EFFORT, HEADEDBY THE NIGERIANS.

Q: HODDING, COULD I JUST FOLLOW THAT UP?

MORE SPECIFICALLY, IS THERE NO PRESENT HOPE OF TWO THINGS:

ONE, IS THERE A POSSIBILITY OF PERSUADING THE SOMALI GOVERNMENT TO WITHDRAW FROM THE OGADEN? AMBASSADOR LUGHRAN HAS BEEN BACK AND FORTH A COUPLE OF TIMES RECENTLY, AND PRESUMABLY SINCE WE STILL IDENTIFY THE SOMALIS AS THE AGGRESSORS, WE WOULD LIKE HIM TO LEAVE ---

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AND TWO, IS THERE NO INCLINATION OR PLANNING HERE TO MOVE THE CENTER OF ARBITRATION IN THIS AFFAIR FROM THE OAU TO THE UNITED NATIONS?

A: WELL THAT FRANKLY, SUCH A MOVE AS THE LATTER, WOULD BE ONE WHICH WOULD ONLY BE SUPPORTED, I THINK IF IN FACT THE OAU AND THAT PARTICULAR ARBITRATION GROUP, IN PARTICULAR, WISHED TO DO SO.

IN THE ABSENCE OF SUCH A --

Q: ISN'T THAT A LOGICAL POSSIBILITY?

A: WELL THAT, I THINK, WILL HAVE TO BE ADDRESSED TO THEM. WE ARE NOT GOING TO SUGGEST PUBLICLY WHAT THE OAU SHOULD,

OR SHOULDN'T DO IN THIS KIND OF THING.

WE BELIEVE THAT THEIR MISSION IS VERY IMPORTANT.

NOW THE FIRST QUESTION, HOWEVER, HAD TO DO WITH WHETHER OR NOT WE AREN'T INTERESTED IN FACTS. WE ARE.

Q: AND DO WE HAVE ANY PROSPECTS OF SUCCEEDING?

A: WELL I AM NOT GOING TO GO INTO THE SUBJECT MATTER OF ANY DISCUSSIONS WE HAVE WITH THE SOMALIS AND OTHERS. I WOULD JUST SIMPLY SAY THAT WHAT WE HAVE SAID PUBLICLY ON THIS SUBJECT -- THATWE HAVEMADE THAT CLEAR PRIVATELY, AS WELL.

Q: IS IT CORRECT THAT YOU ARE ASKING THE RUSSIANS TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES IN ETHIOPIA -- BUT NOT ASKING THEM TO GET OUT OF ETHIOPIA?

A: WELL, WHAT WE REALLY HOPE, OBVIOUSLY, IS THAT ALL OUTSIDE FORCES BE REMOVED, AND THAT THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY UNCLASSIFIED

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OF ETHIOPIA BE RESPECTED -- THAT THE CONFLICT BE ENDED -- AND ALL OF THOSE THINGS, I THINK, ARE SIMULTANEOUSLY PART OF OUR OVERALL OBJECTIVE.

Q: WITHIN THE LIFE OF THIS PRESENT ADMINISTRATION WE HAVE SEEN THE UNITED STATES APPLAUDING THE INTERVENTION OF THE UNITED STATES AND FRANCE, IN ZAIRE, UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES ALMOST PRECISELY PARALLEL WITH THOSE THAT EXIST IN ETHIOPIA --

A: WELL, LET ME JUST DEAL WITH THE CONSISTENCY LINE ON ETHIOPIA, AND JUST SAY THAT THAT IS THE POLICY.

Q: RIGHT. COULD YOU GO OVER THAT DOTTED LINE THAT YOU SAY IS A BORDER AND SAY WHETHER YOU FEEL THE EGYPTIANS, THE IRANIANS, THE SUDANESE AND ALL SHOULD STOP THEIR ASSISTANCE TO SOMALIA? I DON'T KNOW IF YOU ACCEPT THE PREMISE, BUT AT LEAST PRIVATELY THE ADMINISTRATION DOES ACKNOWLEDGE SOMALIA AS THE AGGRESSOR.

A: LOO:, WHAT I HAVE SAID AND WHAT I CONTINUE TO SAY IS THAT WE SUPPORT THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF ETHIOPIA AND WE BELIEVE THAT ALL OUTSIDE FORCES THERE SHOULD IN FACT NOT BE THERE.

Q: WELL, HOW ABOUT OUTSIDE FORCES IN SOMALIA? SHOULD THEY BE THERE?

A: LET ME DEAL WITH THAT WHEN IT BECOMES A PROBLEM. I

DON'T HAVE ANY --

Q: YOU MEAN THE EGYPTIANS AND THE IRANIANS AREN'T PUMPING AID INTO IT? I DON'T SUPPOSE THEY JUST DROP OFF THE EQUIP-UNCLASSIFIED

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MENT AND RACE FOR THE NEAREST AIRPORT TO GET OUT OF TOWN.

A: I THINK I'VE SPOKEN ON THIS WHOLE SUBJECT BEFORE.

 $\mathbf{Q}\!\!:\!\mathbf{I}$  JUST WANTED TO MAKE IT PARALLEL AND CONSISTENT AND LINK THIS.

Q: YOU'RE NOT SURELY SUGGESTING THAT THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF ETHIOPIA IS BEING VIOLATED BY CUBA AND THE SOVIET UNION, NO OTHER PARTY, SO THE ONLY VIOLATOR OF THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY IS SOMALIA.

A: I AM SAYING THAT WHAT WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO DO IS TO SEE TO IT THAT THAT TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY IS RESTORED. I'M NOT GOING TO START ITEMIZING EVERYONE WHO'S INVOLVED. WE HAVE, HOWEVER, SAID IN THE PAST THE REASON WE RECONSIDERED OUR TENTATIVE OFFER OF ARMS, IF YOU RECALL, TO SOMALIA WAS PRECISELY BECAUSE OF THE INVOLVEMENT IN THAT CONFLICT. O.K.?

Q: HODDING, BACK TO THE OAU MISSION, A FEW WEEKS AGO WE HEARD THAT THERE WERE SOME PRELIMINARY INDICATIONS THAT THEY HAD MADE SOME PROGRESS. NOW, OF COURSE, THAT DOESN'T SEEM TO HAVE BEEN BORNE OUT BY THE FACTS. WHAT IS THE STATE OF THE OAU MEDIATION RIGHT NOW?

A: I THINK I'M GOING TO HAVE TO TAKE THE QUESTION.

I BELIEVE THEY MADE VISITS RECENTLY TO BOTH COUNTRIES. I AM NOT SURE AT THIS POINT WHERE WE ARE.

Q: HODDING, TO GO BACK TO THE BASIC POLICY, YOU SAY IT IS A MATTER OF POLICY NOT TO HAVE LINKAGE BETWEEN SALT AND SOVIET BEHAVIOR ELSEWHERE. IS THAT POLICY ITSELF UNDER CHALLENGE IN THE ADMINISTRATION? IS THERE SOME THOUGHT TO RECONSIDERING THE POLICY? UNCLASSIFIED

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A: I'M NOT AWARE OF ANY. I'M NOT AWARE OF A RECONSIDERATION OF THAT. I BELIEVE THAT THE LINKAGE THING REMAINS. I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THAT'S A SUBJECT OF RECONSIDERATION.

Q: HODDING, I ASKED THREE TIMES JUST TO BE SPECIFIC. WHEN

YOU SAY "ALL OUTSIDE FORCES, YOU'RE INCLUDING SOMALI FORCES: RIGHT?

A: I AM SUGGESTING THAT WE BELIEVE THAT THE ULIMATE END OF THAT CONFLICT SHOULD BE THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF ETHIOPIA AND, IN FACT, WE BELIEVE THAT THE OVERALL PRINCIPLE HAS TO BE RESPECT FOR THE INTEGRITY OF THE TERRITORY OF ALL THE COUNTRIES THERE, AS IN FACT ANYWHERE ELSE, AND THAT OBVIOUSLY WE RUN THAT BOTH WAYS -- WHICH IS WHAT THE CONCERN WAS THAT WAS RAISED IN THE PAST.

Q: I UNDERSTAND THAT. AREN'T YOU CALLING ON THE SOMALIS TO WITHDRAW?

A: I AM NOT WRITING THAT LEAD. I HAVE REALLY SAID REPEATEDLY WHAT IT IS WE WANT. I AM JUST NOT GOING BEYOND THAT.

Q: WELL: HAVEN'T THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY SPECIFICALLY CALLED FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOMALIAN FORCES?

A: WE HAVE DONE IT EVERY TIME, BUT THAT ISN'T FOR ME TO DO UP HERE TODAY.

Q: WE HAVE SAID, AND YOU HAVE SAID HERE REPEATEDLY TODAY, THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT SEND ARMS TO SOMALIA. UNCLASSIFIED

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HAVE WE ADVISED OUR STAUNCHEST ALLIES -- EGYPT, SAUDIA ARABIA, AND OTHER -- ALSO TO REFRAIN FROM SENDING ARMS TO SOMALIA?

A: JOE, HONEST TO GOODNESS, I'VE BEEN AROUND THIS ONE I THINK THREE OF FOUR TIMES. THE ANSWER IS WE HAVE MADE KNOWN PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY WHAT OUR POLICY IS AND OUR CONCERNS ABOUT THE PROVISION OF MATERIAL, MEN -- ANYTHING WHICH FUELS THE CONFLICT.

Q: WELL, NO. WHAT I'M ASKING YOU IS WHETHER WE HAVE SPECIFICALLY ASKED THESE TWO GOVERNMENT, OR OTHER GOVERNMENT WHO ARE SENDING SUPPLIES INTO SOMALIA, NOT TO DO IT. THIS IS ALL I'M ASKING. HAVE WE DONE THIS?

A: JOE, I HAVE SAID BEFORE THAT WE HAVE SPOKEN TO A NUMBER -- I'M NOT GOING TO SPECIFY -- OF GOVERNMENTS AND MADE OUR POLICY CLEAR AND MADE CLEAR TO THEM WHAT WE THINK IS THE PROPER COURSE OF ACTION. THE ANSWER, THEREFORE, TO YOU IS YES. BUT I'M NOT GONG TO SAY YES TO A, B, C NATIONS.

Q: WELL, LET ME JUST FOLLOW THIS UP WITH A SITUATION THAT EVOLVES IN THE SENATE IN WHICH SENATOR EAGLETON URGES

TRANSFER OF U.S. ARMS TO SOMALIA. DOES THE ADMINISTRATION SUPPORT SENATOR EAGLETON'S POSITION?

A: HE ADVOCATES THE TRANSFER OF ARMS TO SOMALIA? I'VE JUST SAID WHAT THE ADMINISTRATION'S POSITION IS.

Q: ALL RIGHT. NOW, SENATOR MOYNIHAN HAS QUITE A DIFFERENT VIEW, AND HE REFERS TO SOMALIA AS "ARROGANT, RUTHLESS."

"SOMALIA PROUD TO BE THE WHORE OF RUSSIA AND PROUD OF ITS ASSOCIATION WITH CUBA." HE OPPOSES ANY SUPPORT FOR SOMALIA. WHAT DO WE THINK OF THAT? UNCLASSIFIED

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A: WE HAVE A POLICY WHICH IS WE'RE NOT GOING TO GIVE ANY ARMS SUPPORT TO SOMALIA. VANCE UNQUOTE VANCE

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